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We study the relationship between process and product innovations in
vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies. A process innovation can lead two
competing ﬁrms to improve the quality of their goods introducing a
product innovation. In fact, a cost reducing innovation has two eﬀects:
it spurs production and it enhances price competition. The former eﬀect
induces both ﬁrms to increase quality. The latter encourages diﬀerenti-
ation, inducing low quality ﬁrm to decrease it. Therefore, high quality
ﬁrm always improves its quality, while the other may or may not. The
prevailing eﬀect depends on the nature of quality costs (ﬁxed or vari-
able).1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the present paper we study the relationship between process and
product innovation, which we judge of the utmost relevance for the un-
derstanding of technological dynamics. The theoretical literature repre-
sents process innovation by cost reductions and product innovation by
increases of the demand schedule. However, only few contributions deal
with both kinds of innovation (e.g. Bonanno, Haworth - 1988, Lamber-
tini, Orsini - 2000) and even fewer investigate the relationship between
the two. Remarkable examples are the papers due to Athey, Schmutzler
(1995) and Eswaran, Gallini (1996).
Athey and Schmutzler (1995) prove that process innovation (cost-
reducing) and product innovation (demand-enhancing) are complemen-
tary. In the short run, an increase in ﬁrm’s net revenue of one type of in-
novation induces the ﬁrm to implement also innovation of the other kind.
Intuitively, product innovation shifts the demand curve incentivating the
ﬁrm to increase output. The higher the quantity, the bigger is the return
to lowering unit costs (process innovation). Therefore, the ﬁrm will tend
to implement process as well as product innovation. For an analogous
reasoning, long run variables such as investments in product design ﬂex-
ibility and process ﬂexibility show the same kind of complementarity.
Lin, Saggi (2002) in a framework of horizontal product diﬀerentiation
ﬁnd similar results to Athey and Schmutzler (1995). Moreover, in their
model ﬁrms invest more in product R&D if they are allowed to invest
also in process one, rather than in the case where process R&D is not
available.
Eswaran, Gallini (1996), instead, study the relationship between
process and product innovation in order to describe the eﬀects of diﬀer-
ent patent policies. They present a model of horizontally diﬀerentiated
products, where a competitor can eventually challenge the incumbent
ﬁrm, called pioneer. The former enters the market with an horizontally
diﬀerentiated product. In this model, the degree of diﬀerentiation cor-
responds to the intensity of product innovation. However, the more the
entrant diﬀerentiates and the softer price competition is, hence the lower
is the incentive to introduce process innovations. Thus, in their frame-
work, the two kinds of innovation are substitute, since the incentive to
adopt a process innovation is lower when product innovation is larger.1
In our paper we consider a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation,
1The approach of Eswaran Gallini was further developed in a recent paper by
Rosenkranz (2003). The author shows that antitrust policy towards R&D coopera-
tion aﬀects innovative decisions and moreover the direction of technological change,
in a model where consumer has a preference over variety and ﬁrms simultaneously
choose between process or product innovation.
1which we think as more suitable to represent product innovations (i.e.,
quality improvements), than horizontal ones. Furthermore, we assume
imperfect competition (a duopoly) even before the innovation is adopted
and the adoption of a process innovation at the outset of the game. In
summary, our setup is more similar to that of Eswaran, Gallini (1996),
but our results are closer to those of Athey Schmutzler (1995). In fact,
we prove that a process innovation (cost reducing) can lead ﬁrms to
invest and improve the quality of their goods and thus to adopt a prod-
uct innovation. Therefore the two kinds of innovation are complemen-
tary. However, we model the opposite causal eﬀect between product and
process innovation with respect to the previous contributions, namely,
that from process to product one.
The choice of a vertical diﬀerentiation model seems to us a natural
one, even though it implies a non trivial choice among diﬀerent mod-
els. The two main choices concern the market coverage and the cost of
quality. As for the former, we assumed a partially covered market, since
we wish to better capture the demand enhancing character of product
innovation. This assumption is consistent with most of the literature on
the subject. More crucial is the assumption on the latter choice, that
concerning costs of quality. The literature of vertical product diﬀerenti-
ation can be divided into two classes of models. The ﬁrst one assumes
that a higher quality level implies a higher ﬁxed cost (Shaked, Sutton,
1983; Bonanno, 1986), that is, the cost of quality does not interact
with the cost of quantity. While the second one assumes that the choice
of a better quality induces a higher marginal production cost (Mussa,
Rosen, 1978; Gal-Or, 1983). Usually the former assumption is consid-
ered suitable to describe a ﬁrm investing in R&D. While the assumption
of variable costs of quality is compatible with the adoption of a new,
quality improving, technology, involving the choice of inputs of better
quality. For instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, the production
of a better drug often entails the introduction of a higher percentage
of active ingredient for each unit of production, which implies higher
marginal production costs. Therefore, in this speciﬁcc a s eap r o d u c t
innovation entails higher marginal costs. In our analysis we consider
separately both ﬁxed and variable costs of quality.
The assumptions on the quality cost aﬀects important details also of
our results. In a duopoly with variable costs of quality, ﬁrms improve the
quality levels of their products, but also product diﬀerentiation increases,
if a process innovation is available to both ﬁrms. That is, the quality of
the high quality ﬁrm increases more than that of the low quality one.
Diﬀerently, in a duopoly with ﬁxed costs of quality, the results depend
on the initial production costs. A process innovation makes the leader
2ﬁrm increase its quality level and the follower one decrease it, if produc-
tion cost are low also before adoption. Conversely, if production costs
before innovation are high, both ﬁrms will improve their quality level,
but in this case (and diﬀerently from variable costs) reducing vertical
diﬀerentiation.
The economic intuition of the results is the following. A process inno-
vation has two diﬀerent eﬀects. A process innovation induces lower costs
and therefore makes it convenient to increase production. Therefore any
strategy which allows to increase the price becomes more proﬁtable,
for given cost function. Hence ﬁrms have higher incentives to improve
the quality of their goods. However there is a second eﬀect of process
innovation. Since products are less costly price competition becomes
tougher. Firms will react adopting strategies based on non-price-factor,
the most important of which is an increase in product diﬀerentiation.
In our setup ﬁrms have diﬀerent incentives to diﬀerentiate. Therefore
the high quality ﬁrm wishes to increase the quality of its product, while
the low quality one to decrease it. Hence this latter eﬀect works in the
same direction of the former for the high quality ﬁrm, while it works
in the opposite one for the low quality one. The implication of the two
combined eﬀects are that the high quality ﬁrm will always improve the
quality of its product, while the low quality one will improve it only if
the former eﬀect prevails on the latter. When the latter prevails ﬁrm
2 reduces quality. This happens only with ﬁxed costs when production
costs are low.
Recently, Bandyopadadhyay, Acharyya, (2004) proposed a model
which has some similarities to ours. They examine the complementarity
between process and product innovations in a monopoly with vertical dif-
ferentiation. Complementarity arises when a process innovation makes
product innovation proﬁtable, thus inducing the monopolist to adopt it.
Also their results depend on the nature of the innovation costs (ﬁxo r
variable): when quality costs are variable complementarity holds only
with partial coverage, but when they are ﬁxed the complementarity re-
sults holds unambiguously. However, since they study a monopoly, they
completely neglect any strategic issue.
Some examples of the interdependence between product and process
technology are, in the ﬁeld of laser printers and of automobile industries;
in both cases of process innovations for building established products in-
duce new and better quality versions of the goods. For instance, in the
Seventies, Bob Metcalfe developed Ethernet in the Xerox Parc Labora-
tories. Ethernet technology was able to send a larger amount of data to
the laser printers, therefore it can be considered a process innovation. Si-
multaneously, Xerox has been forced to produce a new hardware, namely
3a faster printer to exploit the new technology (Varian, Shapiro 1999).
Our model oﬀers a theoretical explanation to this process. Initially a
ﬁrm introduces a cost reducing innovation; then it is forced to invest in
R&D and to introduce a new, higher quality hardware, namely a prod-
uct innovation. The ﬁnal level of market diﬀerentiation depends upon
the competitors’ reactions.
Analogously, the use of plastic in the car industry was initially meant
to reduce production costs and certainly not car quality; in this case
we have a process innovation. Later on, research on modern materials
helped car manufacturers to use plastic also to improve product quality
and now luxury brands too make use of plastic parts for the body and
the interior of cars. Again, our model is suitable to describe this equilib-
rium path. At the beginning, plastic parts (for instance bumpers) were a
cost-reducing innovation. Then, according to an increase in market com-
petition, ﬁrms try to diﬀerentiate their products from the competitors’
ones and improve the quality of bumpers (and hence of cars).
In the following sections of the paper we will introduce the model
and our analytical results. Section 2 introduces the formal model of
vertical diﬀerentiation and the assumptions. In the Section 3, we fully
develop the model with variable costs of quality. First, we analyze the
comparative statics, uniqueness and existence of the equilibrium in the
model without innovation. Then we introduce the game with innovation,
both in the symmetric and asymmetric cases. Analogously, Section 4
solves the model with ﬁxed costs. In the Section 5, some concluding
remarks will close the paper.
2 Description of the Model
In this section we present the model, starting from the description of the
timing of the game. Then the demand will be described. Finally we will
introduce the technology, distinguishing between the cases of variable
and ﬁxed costs of quality.
2.1 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the two ﬁrms
simultaneously decide whether to adopt a freely available process inno-
vation. In the second stage ﬁrms set the quality θi,i =1 ,2.T h e n i n
the ﬁnal stage of the game, ﬁrms simultaneously set prices. Therefore,
referring to the standard model of quality choice, we add a stage at the
beginning of the game. Namely, in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide whether
to adopt or not a cost reducing innovation.
42.2 The Demand
As in standard models of vertical diﬀerentiation, we assume that each
consumer has the following indirect utility function:
uh = hθi − pi with i =1 ,2
where the parameter h is uniformly distributed on [0,1], and represents
the consumers’ marginal rate of substitution between money and quality.
θi measures the quality level of the ﬁnal good yi. pi is the unit price for
the good produced by ﬁrm i. We impose that consumers can purchase
at most one unit of the good, as it is standard in this class of models.
Without loss of generality, we assume that θ1 ≥ θ2.H e n c e ,w eh a v e
two marginal consumers, the former is indiﬀerent between buying the
low quality good and not buying at all, characterized by a parameter
value: h02 =
p2
θ2; the latter is indiﬀerent between buying good 1 or good
2, characterized by a parameter value: h21 =
p1−p2
θ1−θ2. Hence, the demand
functions for the high quality and the low quality ﬁrms are the standard
ones in this class of models with partial coverage:












Empirically, cost of quality might have both a variable component and
a ﬁxed one. However, following the literature, we will solve separately
the two models. We start introducing the variable costs model, because
its results are more clear-cut than those of the ﬁxed costs one.
2.3.1 Variable Costs
For computation simplicity and in agreement with most of the literature,





yi with i =1 ,2 (3)
with ci < 1.
Using the respective demand functions (1) and (2), the proﬁt func-
tions become:



































+ aiyi with i =1 ,2
with k<1.
Therefore, proﬁt functions for Firms 1 and 2 are respectively:


























3 Solution of the Model: Variable Costs
Given the proﬁt functions, (4) and (5), we solve the game backwards,
starting from the price stage. First, we will analyze the existence and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium of the model without innovation. Second,
we perform the comparative statics of the same model. Finally, we will
show that the comparative statics is useful in characterizing the game
with innovation.
Solving the system of ﬁrst order conditions for prices, we obtain the





















Substituting (8) and (9) in the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fF i r m1 and simplify, we
obtain the proﬁt as a function only of the two quality levels. The proﬁt
function of Firm 1 and 2 are respectively:
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6Now, we are ready to solve the second stage of the game where ﬁrms
choose the products quality. The following proposition proves that the
equilibrium does exist. In equilibrium, ﬁrms will choose to partially
diﬀerentiate their products when there is a cost in improving quality.
Moreover, we are able to ﬁnd a set of parameter values (the cost pa-
rameter of each ﬁrm ci,a sd e ﬁned in (3)) for which the equilibrium is
“unique”. Later, we are able to fully characterize the unique equilibrium
of our model.
Proposition 1 There exists a non empty open set of parameter values
-
c2
c1 ∈ (0.94,1.06) - for which the model has an equilibrium. The equilib-
rium where θ1 >θ 2 is unique and it implies that ﬁrms will diﬀerentiate
the quality level of their products.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that the set of parameter values speciﬁed in the previous
proposition is rather large. In fact, it implies a diﬀerence of ±6% in
the marginal costs, a diﬀerence which seems to us quite substantial.
T h e r ea r es t i l ls o m ed i ﬃculties in performing comparative statics. It is
obvious that when the model is symmetric there exist two equilibria: one
where Firm 1 produces at a higher quality level (the one we studied) and
a second (symmetric with respect to the former) where Firm 2 produces
at higher quality level. In the case of a symmetric model the choice
between the two equilibria is irrelevant, because they are equivalent up
to a name permutation. However, if we set:
c = c2
c1 = mc, (12)
thus m = c1/c2,w ec a nﬁnd a set of equilibria (parameterized to m)
which converges to that of the symmetric equilibrium as m → 1.T h i s ,
together with the existence of two equilibria in the symmetric case, im-
plies that in the relevant range of parameter values there are two equi-
libria, which are substantially diﬀerent if m 6=1 . In order to simplify the
analysis and to maintain uniqueness, we assume that Firm 1 produces
the highest quality good. With this restriction in mind, Proposition 1
guarantees a unique equilibrium, which allows to prove a simple compar-
ative statics result, summarized in the next Proposition. Before stating
the following Proposition notice that m is an inverse measure of the
technological advantage of Firm 1; therefore when it decreases Firm’s 1
technology improves compared to that of Firm 2. Namely, when m<1
Firm 1 is more productive than Firm 2, while the opposite occurs when
m>1.
7Proposition 2 (a) Product quality and product diﬀerentiation increase








with θ1 (m) >θ 2 (m).
(b) Product quality of Firm 1 and product diﬀerentiation increase also if
Firm 1 increases its technological advantage, i.e. m decreases. Product
quality of Firm 2 ﬁrst decreases then increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We derived all the needed results for the vertical diﬀerentiation model
without innovation. We now have to ﬁnd their implications for the
innovation model, starting from the solution of the ﬁrst stage of the
game, where the two ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to innovate or
not. Afterwards, we have to characterize how innovation aﬀects vertical
products diﬀerentiation. Process innovation is represented by a decrease
in ci, namely c = c2 and c1 = mc, which can be induced, for instance, by
the use of a new production input or process. Obviously, ﬁrms innovate
only if it is proﬁtable to do so. Therefore, ﬁrst we have to ascertain what
happens to proﬁts. The next Proposition solves this problem in a rather
simple way.
Proposition 3 Adopting an innovation is an equilibrium strategy for
both ﬁrms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the comparative statics analysis we will consider two diﬀerent
kinds of process innovations. We deﬁne the ﬁrst one equiproportional,b e -
cause it leaves the ratio between the two marginal costs, m, unchanged.
This kind of innovation can be parameterized through a decrease in c.
The second type of innovation increases the technological advantage of
Firm 1 with respect to Firm 2 and can be represented through a decrease
in m, for given c. We call this type of process innovation, disproportional.
We will deal ﬁrst with the equiproportional innovation.
In Proposition 2 we found that the solution has the form: θi =
θi(m)
c ,
i =1 ,2, which is very simply parameterized in c and makes it easy to
perform comparative statics when the innovation is introduced. There-
fore a direct consequence of the mentioned Proposition part (a) is that
8a proportional process innovation makes θ1, θ2 and (θ1 − θ2) increase. If
m decreases, provided that m ≤ 1.3, part (b) of Proposition 2 implies
that diﬀerentiation increases, as part (b) of the following Proposition
s t a t e s .W es u m m a r i z et h ea b o v ed i s c u s s i o ni nt h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 4 If the parameter values are those described in Proposi-
tion 1:
(a) an equiproportional process innovation increases qualities of both
ﬁrms and vertical product diﬀerentiation,
(b) a disproportional process innovation at the advantage of Firm 1 in-
creases quality of Firm 1 and vertical product diﬀerentiation, while prod-
uct quality of Firm 2 ﬁrst decreases and then increases.
T h er e s u l to fP r o p o s i t i o n4 ,i nt h ec a s eo fe q u i p r o p o r t i o n a lp r o c e s s
innovation, has a very compelling economic intuition. In fact, as we said
in the Introduction, a process innovation makes price competition among
ﬁrms tougher and therefore induces them to adopt defensive strategies,
the most important of which is an increase in product diﬀerentiation.
Given the result on diﬀerentiation, it is not surprising that Firm 1 ex-
ploits the cost reduction in order to increase the quality. Slightly more
surprising is that also the second Firm quality increases, since it faces a
trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, it ﬁnds it more convenient to increase qual-
ity, given the cost reduction. On the other hand, it has an incentives to
lower quality in order to increase product diﬀerentiation. However, since
Firm 1 is increasing signiﬁcantly its quality, the latter eﬀect is dominated
by the former.
By the same reasoning, in the case of disproportional process inno-
vation, Firm 1 has an incentive to diﬀerentiate its output from that of
the opponent ﬁrm, increasing quality diﬀerentiation. By so doing, it
also increases its advantage in producing higher quantities of the good,
since it beneﬁts of lower marginal costs. Firm 2 faces a trade-oﬀ,a s
already said. It has an incentive to increase diﬀerentiation and therefore
decrease quality, in order to lower price competition. On the other hand,
an increase of Firm 1 quality allows to exploit the higher willingness to
pay of the consumers. The two forces act diﬀerently for diﬀerent ranges
of parameter values, since the intensity of the second eﬀect varies with
its technological advantage. In fact, the quality of Firm 1 increases in
a much faster way as it becomes more and more eﬃcient. Therefore if
the asymmetries between ﬁrms are signiﬁcant also Firm 2 can increase
its quality. As a matter of facts, for small diﬀerences between ﬁrms an
increase of Firm 1 eﬃciency induces a lower quality of the product of
Firm 2, if Firm 1 is much more eﬃcient the opposite is true.
94 Solution of the Model: Fixed Costs
In the present section we assume that there are ﬁxed costs of quality.
While with variable costs we were able to characterize also the asymmet-
ric model, with ﬁx e dc o s tw ea r ea b l et os o l v et h es y m m e t r i cm o d e lo n l y .
For this reason and in order to simplify the exposition, we present the
results of the ﬁxed costs model in a more condensed way, with respect
to the variable costs ones.
We solve the game backwards, starting from the prices stage, as
usual. Solving the system of ﬁrst order conditions, from (6) and (7),
with respect to prices we obtain the equilibrium prices as a function of
the two quality level:
p1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2)=θ1
2(θ1 − θ2)+2 a1 + a2
4θ1 − θ2
(13)
p2 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2)=
(θ1 − θ2)θ2 +2 θ1a2 + a1θ2
4θ1 − θ2
(14)
Substituting the equilibrium prices in the proﬁt functions we obtain:
Π1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,k)= ¡
2θ
2
1 − 2θ1θ2 − 2θ1a1 + θ1a2 + a1θ2
¢2
(4θ1 − θ2)
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as a function of the two quality levels. Now, we can solve the second
stage of the game where ﬁrms choose the products quality. As we al-
ready stated, we can solve only the symmetric model, i.e. a1 = a2 = a.
First we will prove the existence of the equilibrium in the model with-
out innovation. Then we will characterize the game with innovation by
means of comparative statics.
Proposition 5 There exists a unique equilibrium of the symmetric game











Proof. See Appendix B.
In equilibrium ﬁrms diﬀerentiate the quality level of their products,
as it is standard in the literature on vertical diﬀerentiation. We are able
to characterize the range of parameter values where an equilibrium exists
10and it is unique. Now we can solve the ﬁrst stage of the game, where the
two ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to innovate or not, and eventu-
ally how innovation aﬀects quality and vertical products diﬀerentiation.
Firms introduce the innovation only if it is proﬁtable. This is proved in
the following proposition.
Proposition 6 For the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the symmetric
game, the adoption of a process innovation is always proﬁtable for one
of the ﬁrms.
Proof. See Appendix B
We cannot prove whether to adopt the innovation is an equilibrium,
s i n c ew ed i dn o ts o l v et h ea s y m m e t r i cm o d e l . H o w e v e r ,i nt h ea p p e n -
dix we can prove that a small reduction in production costs is always
proﬁt a b l ef o ro n eo ft h eﬁrms. Moreover, we proved graphically that
the adoption of a process innovation which allows a discrete reduction
in production costs is an equilibrium.
Notice that in the proof of Proposition 5, we come up with a unique
solution, for speciﬁc ranges of parameters values. In the model there are
two driving forces induced by a process innovation and already explained
in the introduction of the paper. The former induces all ﬁrms to improve
the quality, while the latter enhances diﬀerentiation. For the high qual-
ity ﬁrm, these two forces both contribute in improving quality, while for
the low quality ﬁrm the attempt to increase product diﬀerentiation can
induce a lowering of the quality level. Moreover, these two forces have
diﬀerent intensities, according to the parameter values. When we con-
sider low production costs, price competition is necessarily tough and
the incentive to improve the quality for Firm 2 are low, since its market
share is relatively small and decreases with the innovation. Therefore
in equilibrium the innovations will induce more product diﬀerentiation.
At the opposite, when we start with high production costs, price com-
petition is milder and both ﬁrms will increase quality. However, the
low quality ﬁrm will have an higher incentive to increase quality than
the high quality one and this will induce a lower vertical diﬀerentiation.
This economic intuition is properly stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (a) If ak ∈ A, process innovation increases Firm’s 1
product quality, θ1, while it decreases that of Firm 2, θ2. Therefore,
vertical product diﬀerentiation increases.
(b) If ak ∈ B, process innovation increases the quality of both products,
θ1, θ2. Moreover, vertical product diﬀerentiation decreases.
11Proof. See Appendix B.
In the equilibrium of case (a), ﬁrms produce at such low costs that
make price competition very tough. Therefore, when process innovation
is introduced, both ﬁrms pursue a quality diﬀerentiation policy, to relax
price-competition. This strategy induces the quality leader, Firm 1,
to increase product quality. Diﬀerently Firm 2 can only decrease its
quality. In summary, process innovation induces product innovation, as
an improvement of product quality, for the high-quality ﬁrm and induces
a lower quality level for the low-quality ﬁrm. If we interpret ﬁxed cost of
quality as R&D investment necessary to obtain higher quality, product
innovation becomes complementary to the original process innovation.
This statement is even more convincing in case (b). Here the equi-
librium is characterized by high production costs. To recover this costs,
ﬁrms are forced to compete on non-price factors, such as quality. Af-
ter the introduction of process innovation and the related fall down in
production costs, both ﬁrms improve the quality level of their goods,
reducing vertical diﬀerentiation. In summary, for both the ﬁrms process
innovation induces a quality improvement which is a product innovation,
under speciﬁc interpretation of the model, e.g., if ﬁxed costs are gener-
ated by R&D investments. In both cases, a process innovation allows
the two ﬁrms to lower the price and increase the quantities sold, as it
can be proved graphically.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The adoption of a process innovation always induces Firm 1, the quality
leader, to choose a better quality; in both cases of variable and ﬁxed costs
of quality. Firm 2, instead, with variable costs of quality, will certainly
choose a higher quality level, while with ﬁxed costs the quality level can
increase or decrease according to the cost level. Product diﬀerentiation
increases with variable costs, while it increases with ﬁxed costs, only in
the second case.
The economic reason for the results is that a process innovation has
two diﬀerent eﬀects. It induces lower costs boosting production, which
makes it more convenient to increase quality. It also makes price com-
petition tougher and therefore spurs vertical diﬀerentiation. The two
eﬀects work in the same direction for the high quality ﬁrm and in the
opposite one for the low quality one. Hence the high quality ﬁrm will
always improve the quality, while the low quality one will improve it
only if the former eﬀect prevails on the latter.
The more natural interpretation of our result is that an adoption
of a process innovation induces always product innovation for the high
12quality ﬁrm and in important regions of the parameter values also for
the low quality one, since the quality of their products improves. There-
fore we can say that in our model process innovation induces product
innovation. For this aspect, our model provides a further motivation for
considering product and process innovations as complementary (Athey
and Schmutzler, 1995).
Moreover our results provide a new logical example of the diﬃculty
in distinguishing between product and process innovations, both theo-
retically and empirically, even though we deserve the distinction between
process and product innovation as one of the most relevant in the whole
theory of technical change.
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14Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the solution in the
asymmetric model for the speciﬁed set of parameters values, we start
by maximizing the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions and computing the ﬁrst order
conditions. Then we show that the solution is an internal one and that
the second order conditions are satisﬁed. Finally we prove that the
equilibrium is unique.
First order conditions
The two proﬁtf u n c t i o n sc a nb ew r i t t e ni nt e r m so fc and m setting
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(4θ1 − θ2)(θ1 − θ2)
(20)
Notice that the ﬁrst terms of (17) and (18) are the numerator of (19)
and (20) respectively. So in our internal solution only the second terms
15in (17) and (18) matter. Therefore the ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed
in internal maxima for the ﬁrm only if the numerator of the fractions in
(17) and (18) are nought. Given that, it is not possible to ﬁnd simply




with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,s i n c eθ2 ≤ θ1. Therefore, we obtain the following
equivalent conditions:
f1 (s/c,xs/c,m)=
−s3 [(2x4 +4 mx3 − x3 − 23mx2 − 4x2 +4 6 mx − 24m)s
−8x3 − 20x2 − 28x + 16] = 0
(22)
f2 (s/c,xs/c,m)=
s3 [(+2x4 − 19x3 +3 8 x2 − 2mx2 + mx − 24x +4 m)s
+14x2 − 22x +8 ]=0
(23)
The system (22) − (23) has a trivial solution, which is θ1 = θ2 = s =0 .




θ1 (2 − mcθ1)
2
is increasing in θ1 in a right neighborhood of 0. Setting s>0,t h e
ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed only if the two expressions in square
brackets are nought. We can easily solve (23) for s and obtain:
s = −
14x2 − 22x +8
(+2x3 − 19x2 +3 8 x − 24)x +( −2x2 + x +4 )m
(24)




which is zero only if the numerator is nought, that is:
(x − 1)(4 − x) · [(8x4 − 42x3 +9 9 x2 − 104x + 48)x+
+(20x3 − 81x2 +8 4 x − 32)m]=0 (25)
This equation has two obvious solutions: x =4and x =1 .T h e ﬁrst
one can be discarded because we have x ≤ 1.I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k t h a t
the second one is not an optimum for Firm 1. In fact, x =1implies
θ1 = θ2 and the limit of the rhs of (17) for θ1 → θ2 is −∞,s i n c et h e
16numerator equals −3
4 (1 − m)
2 c2θ
7, while the denominator tends to 0.
We have ﬁnally that the ﬁrst order condition for internal maxima are




3 +9 9 x






2 +8 4 x − 32
¢
m =0
It is rather diﬃcult to solve this expression for x.H o w e v e r , w e c a n
solve it for m with the interpretation that we ﬁnd the ratio between the
two marginal costs, m, that induces a speciﬁc equilibrium ratio among
qualities, x. This solution is:
m = −
8x4 − 42x3 +9 9 x2 − 104x +4 8
20x3 − 81x2 +8 4 x − 32
x (26)
and substituting again in (24) we obtain:
s =2
20x3 − 81x2 +8 4 x − 32
(4 − x)(8x3 − 46x2 +7 1 x − 36)x
(27)
Internal solutions
If we consider again the expression for y1,s u b s t i t u t e(21) a n dt h e nt h e
last two expressions for m and s, we obtain the following expression in
x:
y1 = −2
4x2 − 11x +6
8x3 − 46x2 +7 1 x − 36
The numerator has two solutions: x =2and x = 3
4, while the denomi-
nator has only one real solution, whose approximate value is x ' 3.662.
Therefore the above expression changes sign in the relevant region x ∈
[0,1] only once, for x = 3
4. Moreover, if we evaluate it for x =0 ,w eo b -
tain y1 =1 /3 > 0. Therefore the relevant range for an internal solution
becomes x ∈ [0,0.75].I fw ed ot h es a m ef o ry2 we obtain:
y2 =2
4x3 − 17x2 +2 6 x − 16
(4 − x)(8x3 − 46x2 +7 1 x − 36)
We already proved that the denominator does not change sign and hence
it is negative. The numerator has only one real root: x =2and therefore
it is also negative in the relevant range. Hence y2 > 0. Finally consider
the expression for s, (27). We already proved that the denominator is



















17and it is therefore negative in the relevant range. Hence s is positive and,
for positive x, both θ1 and θ2 are positive. Therefore we have to prove
for which values of m we have a positive x.C o n s i d e r (26) and notice
that the denominator is equal to the numerator of (27). Therefore the




2 + 198x − 104
which has only one real solution x =1 . Notice that the numerator for
x =1is equal to 9 and therefore it is always positive. Therefore m is
positive for any x ∈ [0,0.75]. Since positive values of m are admissible,
the ﬁrst order conditions will characterize an internal solution, provided
that the proﬁts are non negative and the second order conditions are
globally satisﬁed.
Second order conditions
Notice that the proﬁt functions are continuous. Moreover, it is easy to
check that Πi (θ1/c,θ2/c,c,m)=cΠi (θ1,θ2,1,m). Therefore we can set
c =1 , without loss of generality. Thus the only relevant parameter is m.
Using (26) and (27) we can plot Π1 (θ1,x· s(x),1,m(x)) and Π2 (s(x),θ 2,1,m(x))
in order to ascertain whether there exists a set of parameter values which
satisﬁes globally the second order conditions. For instance, if we set
m =0 .94, the corresponding value of x is that satisfying m(x)=0 .94,
whose approximate value is: x =0 .46616. Substituting this value in
Π1 (θ1 ,x ·s(x), 1,m(x)) and in Π2 (s(x),θ2,1,m(x)), and noticing that
the relevant ranges are θ1 ≥ θ
∗
2 = x∗s(x∗) ' 0.39413, θ1 ≤ 2, θ2 ≥ 0 and
ﬁnally θ2 ≤ θ
∗
1 = s(x∗) ' 0.84549, we can plot the two proﬁt functions
in the relevant regions as in Figures 1. Again, we can set m =1 .06,
the corresponding value of x is that satisfying m(x)=1 .06,w h o s e
approximate value is: x =0 .51188. Substituting in Π1 (θ1 ,x· s(x),
1,m (x)) and in Π2 (s(x),θ 2,1,m(x)), and noticing that the relevant
ranges are θ1 > 0.41031,b e c a u s eo t h e r w i s ey1 is non positive and also
that 0.40811 ≥ x∗s(x∗) ' 0.40663, θ1 ≤ 2, the plot of Firm 1 proﬁt
function in the relevant regions is that in Figure 1. As for θ2,t h er e l e -
vant range is θ2 ≥ 0 and θ2 ≤ θ1 = s(x) ' 0.79439. However, it is easy
to check that for θ2 > 0.77062, y1 is nought and for 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 0.77062
the plot of Firm 2 proﬁtf u n c t i o ni st h a ti nF i g u r e1 .
In the interval θ2 ∈ (0.77062,0.79439] Firm 1 does not sell any good.
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Figure 1: Proﬁts as a function of own quality.
The other ﬁrm’s quality is held constant at the equilibrium level











which is decreasing in the relevant range. Moreover it is easy to check
that Π2 (s(x),θ 2,1,m(x)) evaluated at x =0 .51188 and θ2 =0 .77062 is
bigger than this last proﬁt function. Hence Π2 has a unique maximum,
w h i c hi st h eo n ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1 .
We can perform the same exercise for various values of the whole range
m ∈ [0.96,1.06] reaching the same qualitative results. By continuity
we can ascertain that the second order conditions are satisﬁed. Finally
notice that the proﬁt levels are always positive and this completes the
proof that the solution are not corner ones. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (a). Let us start with the comparative statics with respect to c.
First notice that ﬁrst order conditions, (22) and (23), they do not depend
any more on c. Therefore if b s and b x,w i t hb x ≤ 1, are a solution of the
system, they do not depend on c. Moreover we have: cθ1 = b s and
cθ2 = b xb s and hence the diﬀerence between θ1 and θ2 increases when c
decreases. Notice that a decrease in c represents an equiproportional
decrease of c1 and c2. Hence we have an increase in diﬀerentiation if
both costs decrease in a proportional way and this proves the ﬁrst part
of the Proposition.
Part (b). Plotting m as in (26) in the range [0,0.75] we obtain the
upper left graph in Figure 2. Notice that the relation is monotonically
increasing for x ∈ [0,0.69].A tx =0 .69, (26) is almost at its maximum,
whose approximate value is 1.3. Therefore the relation between m and
x is monotonically increasing for m ∈ [0,1.3].N o w ,t h ep l o to f(27) in
the range x ∈ [0,0.69] shows that θ1/c is monotonically decreasing in
x and hence in m (See lower left graph in Figure 2). Therefore, when
the technological advantage of Firm 1 increases, its quality increases as
well.
For (27), we have the following expression of the quality of Firm 2:
sx = −2
20x3 − 81x2 +8 4 x − 32
8x4 − 78x3 + 255x2 − 320x + 144
(28)
Plotting (28) in the range x ∈ [0,0.69] we have the lower right graph of










s( 1  –x )
Quality of firm 2
m
Figure 2: Comparative statics with a dispropotional innovation
21product quality of Firm 2 initially decreases, then increases slightly.
Recall that, for given c,t h ed i ﬀerentiation increases if (θ1 − θ2)c =
s(1 − x) increases. For (27) we have:
s(1 − x)=2
(1 − x)(20x3 − 81x2 +8 4 x − 32)
(4 − x)(8x3 − 46x2 +7 1 x − 36)x
whose plot in the range x ∈ [0,0.69] is the upper right graph in Figure 2
and which is monotonically decreasing in x and hence in m. Therefore,
product diﬀerentiation increases as the technological advantage of Firm
1 increases, for given cost of Firm 2, c. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Notice that a process innovation for Firm 1 is equivalent to a reduction of
c1, holding c2 constant that given our variable transformations is equiv-
alent to a reduction in m,h o l d i n gc constant. A process innovation for
Firm 2, instead, is equivalent to a reduction in c2,h o l d i n gc1 constant,
which after our transformation is equivalent to a decrease in c with a
proportional increase in m,s ot h a tmc = c1 is constant. Using (26) and





2 − 11x +6
¢
80x6 − 624x5 +1 8 9 1 x4 − 2885x3 +2 3 9 4 x2 − 1048x + 192
x(−4+x)(8x3 − 46x2 +7 1 x − 36)
3
If we plot the vector:
cΠ1 (s(x)/c,xs(x)/c,m(x)c,c)
m(x)
we obtain the equilibrium proﬁt of Firm 1 as a function of m and see in
F i g u r e3t h a ti ti sd e c r e a s i n g .H e n c ei ti sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable for Firm 1
to adopt a process innovation.
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(8x4 − 42x3 +9 9 x2 − 104x +4 8 )












Figure 3: Proﬁts of the two ﬁrms and asymetries
In case of process innovation of Firm 2, the above expression is propor-
tional to proﬁts of Firm 2, since m(x)c is constant. Process innovation
implies an increase in m.I fw ep l o tt h ev e c t o r :
m(x)cΠ2 (s(x)/c,xs(x)/c,m(x)c,c)
µ(x)
we obtain the equilibrium proﬁt of Firm 2 as a function of m and see in
F i g u r e3t h a ti ti si n c r e a s i n g .H e n c ei ti sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable for Firm 2 to
adopt a process innovation.¥
23Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 5.
In order to prove the existence of a unique solution, given the set of
parameters, we start maximizing the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions, computing
the ﬁrst order conditions. Then we prove that the candidate equilibrium
is an internal solution. Finally we show that second order conditions are
satisﬁed.
First order conditions
Consider ﬁrst that in the symmetric model the proﬁt functions (15) and
(16) rewrite as follows:




1 − 2θ1θ2 − θ1 + θ2
¢2
(4θ1 − θ2)













2 +2 θ2 − 2θ1
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(4θ1 − θ2)













1 − 2θ2θ1 − θ1 + θ2
¢2
(4θ1 − θ2)











2 +2 θ2 − 2θ1
¢2
(4θ1 − θ2)







Diﬀerentiating the above proﬁt functions respectively for θ1 and θ2 we
obtain the ﬁrst order conditions for an internal solution:
F1 (θ1,θ 2,k)=( 2 θ1 − 1)
8θ
2




3 − kθ1 =0 (33)
F1 (θ1,θ 2,k)=( 2 θ1 − 1)
8θ
2




3 − kθ1 =0 (34)
In order to solve the system, we introduce the following transformations:











F2 (θ,xθ,k)=( 2− xθ)
−4x2 +7 θx2 +6 x − 4θx − 8
θ
2x2 (4 − x)
3 − kxθ =0 (36)
It is trivial to solve (35) for k.
k = K (x,θ)=( 2 θ − 1)























2 − 12x +1 6=0












Notice that: 2x(x +2 )( x2 +1 ) is always positive, the discriminant is
positive for 0 ≤ x<0.193306 and ﬁnally the denominator is positive for






















Therefore the ﬁr s tr o o ti sp o s i t i v ei nt h ei n t e r v a lˆ x ≤ x ≤ 0.193306,
which is its relevant range and can be approximated by 0.19043 ≤ x ≤
0.193306. In this range ΘA (·) can be represented as in Figure 4. The
numerator of the second root is negative for 0 ≤ x ≤ ˆ x. Recalling
that also the denominator is negative in the same region, 0 ≤ x ≤ ˆ x
is the relevant area for the second root. The approximate values of the
range of deﬁnition of the second root, whose plot is in Figure 4, are
0 ≤ x ≤ 0.19043.
Internal solutions
Notice that prices pi (θ,xθ,1,1) for i =1 ,2,d e ﬁned in (13) and (14),a r e
always positive for x<1. Moreover, if we substitute (13) and (14) in




25First Root Second Root
x x
Figure 4: ΘA (·) and ΘB (·) respectively
y2 (θ,xθ,)=( θ2 − 2)
θ1
(4θ1 − θ2)θ2
y1 is positive if θ ≥ 1
2 and y2 if xθ ≥ 2. Therefore quantities are always
positive if θ2 ≥ 2.
N o ww eh a v et oc h e c kw h e t h e rp r o ﬁts are positive. Let us start consid-
ering the proﬁt function of Firm 1, using K (x,θ) as deﬁned in (37):
Π1 (θ,xθ,1,1,K(x,θ)) =
1
2 (1 − 2θ)




is positive if and only if one of the two following conditions hold:
14θx− 8θ +1 2+2 x
2 − 17x ≥ 0 and 1 − 2θ ≥ 0 (41)
14θx− 8θ +1 2+2 x
2 − 17x ≤ 0 and 1 − 2θ ≤ 0 (42)
(41) is satisﬁed if θ ≤ 1
2, which is not possible. (42) is satisﬁed if θ ≥ 1
2
and θ ≥ (2x2−17x+12)
2(4−7x) . Plotting θ = (2x2−17x+12)
2(4−7x) in Figure 5, we can see
that for θ>2 the above condition is satisﬁed. Thus condition (42) is
always satisﬁed.
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Figure 5: Condition for a positive proﬁto fF i r m1
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¢
≥ 0
Let start substituting the ﬁrst solution θ = θ2/x = ΘA (x)/x,f o r
0.19043 ≤ x ≤ 0.193306 in G(x,θ) and plot G(x,ΘA (x)/x) in Fig-
ure 6. Substituting the second solution θ = θ2/x = ΘB (x)/x,f o r
0 ≤ x ≤ 0.19043 in G(x,θ) and plot G(x,ΘB (x)/x), we obtain the
plot in Figure 6. The equation is zero for x =0and x =0 .1821247.
Therefore Π2 (·) is positive if 0.1821257 ≤ x ≤ 0.19043.T h e n w e c a n
plot K (x,Θi (x)/x),f o ri = A,B, in the range where both proﬁts, Π1
and Π2, are positive in Figure 7.
Second order conditions
Now we still have to check whether second order conditions are satisﬁed.
Diﬀerentiating (33) and (34) with respect to θ1 and θ2, and introduc-
ing the usual transformation θ1 = θ, θ2 = xθ ,w eg e tt h ef o l l o w i n g
expressions:
˜ F11(θ,x,k)=−8(xθ − 2)
x2θ +5 θx − 5x +2
(4 − x)
4 θ




4θ3 − k (46)
Substituting the ﬁr s tr o o ti n(45) and (46) respectively, we get the graphs

















0.184 0.186 0.188 0.19 0.192 x
Figure 7: Relation between K and x. K (x,ΘA (x)/x) in solid line and
K (x,ΘB (x)/x) in dotted line
28always satisﬁed. Thus the relevant range for x is: 0.1904315 ≤ x ≤
0.193306. Therefore there exists a solution in the range: 0 ≤ k ≤
0.003042. Analogously, substituting the second root in (45) and (46) we
reach similar results, represented in Figures 8. Second order condition
for Firm 1 are always satisﬁed in the range of deﬁnition. Second order
conditions for the second root are always satisﬁed in the range of positive
proﬁts, therefore 0.182126 ≤ x ≤ 0.19043. Finally we compute the range
of k where the solution exists: 0.0059466 ≤ k ≤ 0.0082724. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6
We have to prove that in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium













Πi (θi,θ j,a i,a j,k) (47)
with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j
Let us start with Firm 1. A c c o r d i n gt oe x p r e s s i o n(47),w eh a v et o
prove that:








∂a1Π1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,k) ≤ 0
(48)
Diﬀerentiating proﬁt function (15) for θ1,w eg e t :
dΠ1 (θ1,θ2,a 1,a 2,1)
dθ1











which rewrites, in the symmetric case, as :
G1 (θ1,θ 2,a,a,1) =
(49)
(2θ1 − a)
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Figure 8: Positive proﬁts and second order condition
30Analogously, diﬀerentiating (15) for θ2 we obtain:
∂
∂θ2
Π1 (θ1,θ 2,a,a,1) = −




and also, diﬀerentiating (15) for a1,w eh a v e :
∂
∂a1
Π1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,1) = −2
(2θ1 − θ2)(2θ1 − a)
(4θ1 − θ2)
2






















ρ1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2)
Finally, we get:











We should prove that
dΠ1 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,k)
da1
> 0. Therefore, we have to
show that (2θ1 − a) and the term in parenthesis have the same sign.
Notice that in the symmetric model, where a1 = a2 = a,w ed e ﬁned








/k,f o ri = A,B,w h e r e
Θi(x) is deﬁned in (38) and (39).










and potting the r.h.s. in the range 0.1904315 ≤ x ≤ 0.193306,i th a s
the slope of Figure 9 in the left. Analogously, considering the second






in the range 0.1904315 ≤
x ≤ 0.193306 becomes as in Figure 9 in the right. Given that the above
expressions are both positive, we should prove that:
µ
(2θ1 + θ2)(2θ1 − a)
(4θ1 − θ2)
· ρ1 (θ1,θ 2,a,a)+2( 2 θ1 − θ2)
¶
≥ 0
Introducing the usual transformation, θ1 = θ and θ2 = xθ,a n du s i n g
(37) and (38) (or (39)) the above expression becomes:
310 0.191 0.192 0.193 x
20
30
0.191 0.192 0.193 x






































· (2 − x)
Substituting (38) in (51) we can plot the function in Figure 10. Analo-
gously, using the second root (39) in (51) and we plot it in Figure 10.
Let us consider, now, Firm 2. As in the previous case we should prove
that:











Π2 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,k) ≤ 0
Diﬀerentiating proﬁt function (16) for θ2, we obtain:
∂Π2 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2,1)
∂θ2
=






















First root Second root
Figure 10: Condition of proﬁtability of an inﬁnitesimal innovation for
Firm 1










a + θ1θ2 (4θ1 − 7θ2)
θ
2
2 (4θ1 − θ2)
3 − θ2
Moreover, diﬀerentiating (16) for θ1 we get:
∂
∂θ1
Π2 (θ1,θ 2,a,a,1) = (θ2 − 2a)
2 2θ1 + θ2
(4θ1 − θ2)
3
and diﬀerentiating (16) for a2, we obtain:
∂
∂a2
Π2 (θ1,θ2,a 1,a 2,1) = −2
(2θ1 − θ2)(θ2 − 2a)θ1
(4θ1 − θ2)
2 θ2























ρ2 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2)

















,w i t hi = A (left) and i = B (right)







ρ2 (θ1,θ 2,a 1,a 2) − 2
¶




In order to ascertain the sign of (θ2 − 2a) recall that:
1
k






,i = A,B (55)
T h e r e f o r ew eh a v et oa s c e r t a i nt h es i g no ft h er . h . s .I fw eu s et h eﬁrst






a n dp l o ti ti nt h e
range 0.1904315 ≤ x ≤ 0.193306, we obtain Figure 11 on the left, while
if we substitute the second root we obtain the plot on the right of the
same ﬁgure.
Therefore (55) is always positive. For those values (5) simpliﬁes to:
xθ − 2a
θ(4 − x)
ρ2 (θ,xθ,a,a) − 2 ≤ 0

































First root Second root
Figure 12: Condition of proﬁtability of an inﬁnitesimal innovation for
Firm 2
whose plot in the range 0.1904315 ≤ x ≤ 0.193306 is in Figure 12 and
s h o w st h a ti ti sa l w a y sv e r i ﬁed, both for the ﬁr s tr o o ta n dt h es e c o n d
one. ¥
Remark 8 Notice however that if we set a1 = a2 = 1
100 and increase the
eﬃciency of a1 and a2 separately of 50%, the reaction functions move as
in ﬁgure 13 in the upper and lower graphs respectively. One could also
show that the equilibrium moves in a higher isoproﬁt, even though we
did not trace it in order not to complicate too much the graph.
Proof of Proposition 7
When the innovation is introduced we can perform comparative statics
on a. Notice that in the symmetric model a1 = a2 = a.L e t d e ﬁne
θi = a˜ θi ,t h e r e f o r e˜ θ1 = Θi (x)/x with i = A,B and ˜ θ2 = Θi (x) with
i = A,B.W ed e ﬁne also K = ak and therefore a = K/k. According to
(38), (39) and (37),w ec a nr e w r i t e :
a =
K(x,Θi(x)/x)
k , with i = A,B







k , with i = A,B







kx , with i = A,B
a, θ1 and θ2 are function of x, except for the multiplicative term 1
k.
Therefore, for comparative statics purposes, we can ignore that term.
Notice also that ΘA is monotonically decreasing in x,a si np r e v i o u s
Figure 4. While ΘB is monotonically increasing in x,a si nt h es a m e
Figure 4. Now we can plot θ2 = aΘi (x) and θ1 = aΘi (x)/x with






































Figure 13: Discrete Changes in the Production Costs
36Case a. In Figures 14, we can see θ2 = aΘA(x) and θ1 = aΘA(x)/x for
0.1904315 ≤ x ≤ 0.193306.
As stated in the Proposition, the graphs show that a process innovation,
decreasing a, increases θ1 and decreases θ2. Considering, also, that the
distance between θ1 = aΘA(x)/x and θ2 = aΘA(x) is a measure of
diﬀerentiation, we can plot:










always in Figure 14. The graph shows that the product diﬀerentiation
increases. Considering a diﬀerent measure of the diﬀerentiation level,
such as the ratio x =
θ2
θ1
, we get the same result, as it is shown again in
Figure 14.
Case b.I nF i g u r e1 4w ea l s op l o tθ2 = aΘB (x) and θ1 = aΘB (x)/x for
0.1821257 ≥ x ≥ 0.19043.D i ﬀerently from the previous case, here we
have that both θ1 and θ2 increases with a process innovation decreasing
a. Plotting the diﬀerence between θ1 = aΘB (x)/x and θ2 = aΘB (x) in
t h es a m eF i g u r e1 4 ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h ed i ﬀerentiation increases.














,w eg e tt h es a m er e s u l ti nF i g u r e1 4 .A ss t a t e di nt h eP r o p o s i t i o n ,
when a decreases the diﬀerentiation grows up. ¥
37Firm’s 1 Quality Firm’s 2 Quality
Difference between qualities Ratio between qualities
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θ1 - θ2 θ2 / θ1
Figure 14: Comparative Statics with Fixed Costs of Quality
38